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in evidence.8 The Restatement, therefore,.is in accord with the
Colorado rule. It allows recovery based on negligence alone, and
it makes the use of the rule available only when a specific factual
situation is present.
The last clear chance rule in Colorado has been made simple
and useful. The rule provides a means of presenting a compli-
cated factual situation in a simple manner. We see from the
Colorado decisions that the last clear chance rule is a factual situ-
ation that must be proved the same as all other facts, a factual
situation that must go along with all other facts to the jury for
their determination. A person seeking recovery under the rule
does not-have a separate and distinct cause of action; instead he
has a cause of action based on negligence alone.
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT DIGEST
TIMOTHY WOOLSTON*
By passing the Federal Tort Claims Act 1 in 1946, the United
States has, with certain exceptions to be noted later, consented to
waive her immunity from suits founded in tort. To appreciate
the full significance of the Tort Claims Act, an understanding of
what has gone before is essential.
Prior to 1887, the private relief bills presented to Congress
were the sole means by which a person could satisfy a tort claim
against the United States. The time consuming work resulting
from the consideration of all of these private bills finally prompted
Congress to pass the Tucker Act 2 in 1887. The Tucker Act was
directed at this congestion in Congress and it did alleviate some
of the distress by extending the jurisdiction of the district courts
to include claims for less than $10,000 where such claims were
founded upon the Constitution, a Federal statute, an executive
regulation, or a contract to which the United States was a party.
Because ordinarily, simple tortious conduct is infrequently based
upon a statute or regulation, the Tucker Act did nothing to rid
Congress of the hundreds of claims that were based upon the simple
torts of government agents.
5 Section 479 Restatement of Torts: A plaintiff who has negligently subjected him-
self to a risk of harm from the defendant's subsequent negligence may recover for harm
caused thereby if, immediately preceding the harm, (a) the defendant (i) knows of
the plaintiff's situation and realizes the helpless peril involved therein; or (ii) knows
of the plaintiff's situation and had reason to realize the peril involved therein; or (ill)
would have discovered the plaintiff's situation and thus had reason to realize the plain-
tiff's helpless peril had he exercised the vigilance which it was his duty to the plaintiff
to exercise ...
* Student, University of Denver College of Law.
62 Stat. 992, 28 U.S.C. secs. 1346 (b), 1402 (b), 2401 (b), 2402, 2411, 2412 (b),
2671-2680 (1950). All section references are to Title 28 U.S.C. unless otherwise indi-
cated.'Sec. 1246 (a) (2).
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In 1920, the Suits in Admiralty Act 3 was passed. This Act
extended the jurisdiction of the district courts to cover merchant
ships that were either owned or operated by the government where
such ships caused money damages to private persons or corpora-
tions. This Act did relieve Congress of those torts connected with
admiralty.
The Public Vessels act 4 of 1925 extended the jurisdiction of
the district courts to include the public vessels of the United States.
The greatest waiver of governmental immunity from suit came
with the passage of the Federal Tort Claims Act in 1946. That
the passage of this Act was also prompted by a congressional de-
sire to be rid of the private relief bills can be realized from the
fact that the Tort Claims Act came into being as a part of the gen-
eral plan of Congress to streamline its own procedure by enactment
of the Legislative Reorganization Act.5
LIBERAL ACT SHOULD BE INTERPRETED LIBERALLY
The Tort Claims Act is one of the most progressive pieces of
legislation ever to have come out of Congress. That a liberal atti-
tude should accompany the interpretation of the Act may be seen
from the following language in United States v. Aetna Casualty
and Surety Co. 6 :
In argument before a number of District Courts and Courts of
Appeals, the Government relied upon the doctrine that statutes waiv-
ing sovereign immunity should be strictly construed. We think that
the congressional attitude in passing the Tort Claims Act is more
accurately reflected by Judge Cardozo's statement in Anderson v.
John L. Hayes Construction Co., 243 N. Y. 140, 153 N. E. 28, "The
exemption of the sovereign from suit involves hardship enough where
consent has been withheld. We are not to add to its rigor by refine-
ment of construction where consent has been announced."
While construction of the Act has been toward a direct waiver
of sovereign immunity, the Act itself merely extends the jurisdic-
tion of the district courts to include :7
Civil action on claims against the United States, for money dam-
ages, accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of
property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or
wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while
acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circum-
stances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable
to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the
act or omission occurred.
In substance, the Act 8 provides for venue, appeals, trial with-
out jury, interest, time for commencing actions, definition of terms,
346 U.S.C. sec. 742 (1949).
'46 U.S.C. sec. 781 (1949).
60 Stat. 812 c. 753 (1946). The Tort Claims Act is Title IV of this Reorganiza-
tion Act.
6 70 S. Ct. 207, 216 (1949). ACCORD: Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, 167 F.




administrative agency settlement of claims for less than $1,000,
withdrawal of claims from administrative determination, barring
of further action against the employee, compromise of a claim,
attorney's fees, applicability of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, and the twelve exceptions from coverage by the Act.
SERVICE-CONNECTED CLAIMS
While the terms of the Act are quite broad, thus far the courts
have not been willing to grant a cause of action to military person-
nel where the injuries complained of were service-connectedY The
Supreme Court has said that there is merit in an action by members
of the armed forces, but that no recovery exists. In the very recent
case of Feres v. United States,10 the Supreme Court said that the
relationship of the Government to its military personnel was dis-
tinctively "federal in character" and continued:
No federal law recognizes a recovery such as claimants seek.
The Military Claims Act, 31, U. S. C. sec. 223 (b) (now superseded
by 28 U. S. C. sec. 2672), permitted recovery in some circumstances,
but it specifically excluded claims of military personnel "incident
to their service.-
This court, in deciding claims for wrongs incident to service
under the Tort Claims Act, cannot escape attributing some bearing
upon it to enactments by Congress which provide systems of simple,
certain and uniform compensation for injuries or death of those in
armed services . . . If Congress had contemplated that this Tort Act
would be held to apply in cases of this kind, it is difficult to see why
it should have omitted any provision to adjust these two types of
remedy to each other. The absence of any such adjustment is per-
suasive that there was no awareness that the Act might be interpreted
to permit recovery for injuries incident to military service.
The deceased in the Feres Case died as a result of a barracks fire
on an army post when he was on active duty as a member of the
United States Army. An interesting decision would no doubt
result if the recently decided case of Wham v. United States"
were analogously asserted on the prior compensation argument.
In the Wham case, a District of Columbia policeman was negli-
gently injured by an employee of the Treasury Department. In
allowing the cause of action, the court said that the receipt of
benefits from the policemen and firemen's funds was no bar to the
action notwithstanding the fact that such funds were augmented
by federal money. The court also said that no election of remedies
is necessary under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Again, in Bandy
v. United States,12 a veteran receiving benefits from the Veterans'
Administration while in a veteran's hospital was not precluded
from suing under the Act when the agents of the hospital injured
him through their negligent acts.
O Feres v. United States, Jefferson v. United States, and Griggs v. United States,
340 U. S. 135 (Single opinion for all cases).
10340 U. S. 135 (1950).
11 180 F. 2d 38 (D.C.D.C. 1950).
1292 F. Supp. 360 (D.C. Nev. 1950).
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The courts have found no difficulty at-all in allowing actions
and recovery in the cases of non service-connected injuries where
the claimants have been military personnel. 13 At present the lead-
ing case on this point is the recently decided Brooks v. United
States,14 in which the claimants were soldiers on leave. They were
riding in their private automobile and were struck by an army
truck driven by soldiers who were acting in line of military duty
at the time of the accident. The court said that while the rela-
tionship of the government to its military personnel was "federal
in character", a different relationship exists when such persons
are on authorized leave. Perhaps the learned court has overlooked
the fact that military personnel while on authorized leave are still
subject to federal law and the military regulations of the district
in which they are located.
PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF THE ACT
In any new legislation by which the sovereign abdicates in-
herent power, certain procedural difficulties necessarily arise. In
the Tort Claims Act itself and in the cases construing the Act, it
is apparent that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply to the
Act.15 The difficulty is in determining to what extent and under
what circumstances they do apply. In Howey v. United States,16
the claimants were injured when the taxicab in which they were
riding collided with a mail truck of the government. In the suit
against the taxicab company, the defendant company asserted the
negligence of the postal department employee who was driving the
truck and sought to join the United States as a third party defend-
ant. In allowing the joinder, the court explained that since the
substantive law of Pennsylvania allowed a joinder of joint tort
feasors prior to judgment, such local law controlled in accordance
with the provisoins of 28 U.S.C. sec. 1346 (b). In Capital Transit
Co. v. United States,17 the claimants were similarly situated but
the court denied the joinder, saying in part that the Act refers
only to substantive laws of torts, not to all the incidents of litiga-
tion such as the joinder of parties and further, that the purpose of
the Act was to provide convenient administration and judicial
remedies for torts committed by government agents and to relieve
congressional committees of the overburdening work of consider-
ing special bills for relief. Thus it would appear that there is now
a split of decisions on the matter of joinder of or with the United
States. It might be well to note that the specific language of the
Act provides that the liability of the government shall be deter-
mined " . . .under circumstances where the United States, if a
"Brooks v. United States, 337 U. S. 49 (1950).
"337 U. S. 49 (1950).
"Sec. 1402 (b) ; F. G. Ryal v. United States, 184 F. 2d 616 (7th Cir. 1950), Evans
v. United States, 10 F.R.D. 255 (1950), Brauner v. United States, 10 F.R.D. 468 (1950).
16181 F. 2d 967 (3rd Cir. 1950).
17 183 F. 2d 825 (C.A.D.C. 1950), Certiorari granted 71 S. Ct. 61.
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private person, would be liable ..." 18 (Italics supplied.)
To come within the coverage of the Act, the claimant must
affirmatively plead the specific provisions of the Act as outlined in
28 U.S.C. sec. 1346 (b). This pleading aspect is important because
the jurisdiction of the Federal courts will not be presumed and
proper pleading demands that such jurisdiction be asserted. Thus,
there can be only one remedy and if it appears that the Suits in
Admiralty Act or the Tucker Act provide remedies, the jurisdic-
tional question must be answered by resort to the particular act
involved. In Aktiebolaget Bofors v. United States,19 a suit was
instituted under the Tort Claims Act for damages in the sum of
$2,000,000 for the alleged illegal use of a secret process. The
claimant licensed the United States to produce the Bofors naval
cannon for "United States' use". The government then made the
weapon and equipped the other Allies with it. The court denied
the cause of action under the Tort Claims Act because the action
sounded in contract, not tort and the Tucker Act is controlling in
cases in which the government is a party to a contract. The court
also noted that, where the action is based upon a contract and the
amount is in excess of $10,000, the Court of Claims alone has juris-
diction.
The time period for bringing an action under the Act has been
designated to be no later than one year after August 2, 1946, or
one year after the cause arises, whichever is later.20  In Young v.
United States,21 a cause of action arose in the District of Columbia
where there is a one year statute of limitations for tort actions.
The cause of action was older than one year, but not barred by
the Tort Claims Act. The court allowed the suit on the ground
that a federally created right cannot be barred by a local statute
where the federal statute has its own period of limitations. It
follows that where a local statute grants a greater period for bring-
ing a tort action than that provided in the Act, the federal statute
will control if the action is begun under the Tort Claims Act.
Also, a local revival statute will not have the effect of reviving a
cause of action that has expired under the Act's provisions.
THE AGENCY QUESTION
To show the liability of the government, the negligent or
wrongful conduct of the government's employee must have occurred
while the employee was acting "within the scope of his office or
employment".2 2 Such employee is defined:23
Officers or employees of any federal agency, members of the
military or naval forces of the United States, and persons acting on
behalf of a federal agency in an official capacity, temporarily or per-
sSec. 2672.
"991 F. Supp. 131 (D.C.D.C. 1950).
2"Conner v. United states, 93 F. Supp. 681 (D.C.E.D. Penna. 1950).
21184 F. 2d 587 (C.A.D.C. 1950).
22 Sec. 1346 (b) ; Cannon v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 820 (D.C. Calif. 1949).
2Sec. 2671.
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manently in the service of the United States, whether with or without
compensation.
The usual rules of the law of agency are determinative of the ca-
pacity. Thus, the government was not liable when an employee
of the Alaska Railroad, a governmental corporation, was on a frolic
of his own when he was injured by a speeder belonging to the rail-
road.24  Members of the armed forces are within the scope of their
employment when they are acting in line of duty.25 In the recent
case of United States v. Fotopulos,26 a civilian was injured when
the automobile in which he was waiting for a red traffic light to
change was smashed into by an army truck driven by a soldier who
was on an official errand. The court said that the soldier was act-
ing in line of duty and the government must respond in damages
for his act. Where the act of the agent is both personal and official,
the court employed this language as controlling of its policy :27
Where a servant is attending to both his own and his master's
business at the same time, no nice inquiry will be made as to which
business the servant is actually engaged in, .... but the master will
be held responsible, unless the servant clearly could not have been
directly or indirectly serving the master.
In Christian v. United States,28 the United States Army furnished a
truck and soldier-driver to take some persons into a nearby town.
While in town and after having deposited the passengers, the
soldier visited several bars and became disorderly. A deputy
sheriff who was attempting to arrest the soldier was killed by him.
The court said that the soldier had completely deviated from his
employment and the government was not liable for his acts.
EXCEPTIONS UNDER THE ACT
There are twelve exceptions from the Tort Claims Act.29 There
has been litigation in very few of the excepted fields. Perhaps the
most important exclusion is that dealing with discretionary
actions.3 0 The Act provides: 31
Any claim based upon an act or omission of any employee of the
Government exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or
regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or
based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal
agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the dis-
cretion involved be abused.
It is clear that the reasoning behind the exceptions is that the sov-
ereign may stipulate any conditions he sees fit when he is allowing
'
4
Tucker v. United States, 91 F. Supp. 527 (D.C. Alaska 1950).
Sec. 2671.
2"180 F. 2d 631 (9th Cir. 1950).
"7United States v. Johnson, 181 F. 2d 577 (9th Cir. 1950).
28184 F. 2d 523 (6th Cir. 1950).
2Sec. 2680.
"0 Costley v. United States, 181 F. 2d 723 (5th Cir. 1950), Coates v. United States,
181 F. 2d 816 (8th Cir. 1950), Olson v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 150 (D.C. N.D. 1950).
8Sec. 2680 (a).
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suit to be brought against him, and the prerequisite to bringing
the suit is conformance with the stipulated conditions. This may
be readily analogized from the language in a case defending the
position of trial without a jury in actions under the Act.3 2 The
cases construing the "discretionary clause" follow the general rules
for determining whether a function is discretionary or ministerial.
In Coates v. United States,33 a farm was damaged when the course
of the Missouri River was changed incident to the reclamation
of arid lands. The reclamation work was said to be discretionary
because of the wide scope and general policy of the project. In
Olson v. United States,34 suit was commenced under the Act for
damages arising from injury to livestock and realty when a flood
gate was opened at a time when the regular course of the river was
blocked by ice and snow. The court denied a cause of action be-
cause the complaint fell within the "discretionary function" excep-
tion of the Act. On the other hand, in Costley v. United States,
35
the wife of a master sergeant was admitted to the maternity ward
of an army hospital and while a patient there, she was given a
harmful substance instead of a spinal anasthesia. As a result of
the harmful injection, she was permanently paralyzed. The court
held the government liable, saying that the discretion of the agents
is at an end once they admit the patient and from that time for-
ward, they owe a duty of due care, diligence and skill.
Generally, the other exceptions are those claims which arise
from loss, miscarriage or negligent transmission of postal matter,
an act of tax assessment or customs, matters covered by the Ad-
miralty Act, an act or failure of an agent in administering secs.
1-31 of Title 50, appendix, fiscal operation of the treasury or reg-
ulation of the monetary system, establishment of a quarantine by
the United States, the operation of a vessel in the Canal Zone,36 a
willful tortious act, combatant activities of the military during time
of war, a tort committed in a foreign country, and the operation of
T. V. A.
DAMAGES
Unless the local law limits the amount of damages recoverable
in any particular action, there is no limitation upon the amount of
recovery for suits instituted under the Federal Tort Claims Act.3 7
The Act has not abrogated the necessity for a congressional appro-
priation before the amount of the award is paid to the successful
claimant.
nUarte v. United States, 7 F.R.D. 705 (D.C. Calif. 1948).
" Note 30, supra.
"Note 30, supra.
5 Note 30, supra.
"Sec. 2680 (g). Repealed Sept. 26, 1950 64 Stat. 1043, c. 1049, sec. 13 (5).
3 Sees. 2672, 2674, Wham v. United States, 180 F. 2d 38 (D.C.D.C. 1950).
NOTE: For an excellent analysis of the Act, see Yankwich, Judge Leon R., Prob-
lems Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 9 F.R.D. 143 (1949).
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